Sunday, March 6, 2011

How to Effectively Rebuild the Broken Kyrgyz Nation? The Crash Course

Our President Roza Otunbayeva is an outstanding woman; after reading the European news in which she is mentioned, one might have an impression she is a very special woman politician who came to power to fix the Kyrgyz Republic's democracy. Undoubtedly, our head of government Roza Otunbayeva raises awareness about the Central Asia's potential and prospects. But, unfortunately, our new Kyrgyz government is not effective in rebuilding the Kyrgyz nation.

There are better and more efficient alternatives. In the video below, Paul Collier highlights the common mistakes of the national governments in their attempts to rebuild the broken nations. To my astonishment and dissappointment, all of these mistakes have been repeated by Kyrgyzstani government. Find 16 minutes and watch this video, which had a revelational impact on me.

DISCLAIMER: To my disappointment, I found out that from 1998 to 2003, Collier was the director of the World Bank's Development Research Group; he now directs the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford, where he continues to advise policymakers. Bio at Ted.com is available here. Why disappointment? Because I am very sceptical about the World Bank as a legitimate institution anyhow instrumental in helping the poorest nations with managing their financial crises. (Read Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (1996) by Catherine Caufield and Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) by Joseph Stiglitz---the disillusionment with the deeds of the World Bank is guaranteed!)

Despite Collier's affiliation with the World Bank, his arguments are worthy of our attention. Undeniably, we are the kind of the broken nation Collier is talking about. At least out of curiosity and self-defence, we should be interested in the vision of the powerful white Western economic elite. Mr. Collier says, "The record on post-conflict recovery is not very impressive. 40-percent of all post-conflict situations, historically, have reverted to conflict within a decade. In fact, they've accounted for half of all civil wars. Why has the record been so poor? Well, the conventional approach to post-conflict situations has rested on, on kind of, three principles." So what are they, the three misleading principles? And what are the better alternatives in Collier's opinion?

The Three Common Misconceptions According to Collier:
The first Collier's Misleading Principle:
"It's the politics that matters. So, the first thing that is prioratized is politics. Try and build the political settlement first."
The second Collier's Misleading Principle: "And then the second step is to say, "The situation is admittedly dangerous, but only for a short time. So, get peacekeepers there, but get them home as soon as possible." So, short-term peacekeepers."
The third Collier's Misleading Principle: "And thirdly, what is the exit strategy for the peacekeepers? It's an election. That will produce a legitimate and accountable government. So, that's a conventional approach."
Then Collier deconstructs everything he has said by claiming, "I think, that approach denies reality."

Collier's Combatting the Three Misconceptions in His Ted.com Talk:
"I've tried to look at the risks of reversion to conflict during our post-conflict decade. And the risks stay high throughout the decade. And they stay high regardless of the political innovations.

Does an election produce an accountable and legitimate government? What an election produces is a winner and a loser. And the lose is unreconciled.

The reality is that we need to reverse the sequence. It's not the politics first; it's actually the politcs last.

The politics become easier as the decade progresses if you're building on a foundation of security and economic development. The rebuilding of prosperity.

Why does the politics get easier? And why it is so difficult initially?

Because after years of stagnation and decline, the mentality of politics is that it's a zero-sum game. If the reality is stagnation, I can only go up, if you go down. And that doesn't produce a productive politics. And so the mentality has to shift from zero-sum to positive-sum before you can get a productive politics. You can only get positive, that mental shift, if the reality is that the prosperioty is being built. And in order to build prosperity, we need security in place."

I agree with the Collier that there is no quick fix, especially, as he has highlighted, no quick fix of the security system. At the moment, in Kyrgyzstan is very unsafe to live and travel, and do bussiness. The warnings coming from the U.S. Department of State are fact-based and should not be ignored by the foreigners traveling to Kyrgyzstan at the moment.
Following the violence in 2010, the situation throughout the country remains tense. More than 80 people were killed in the April 2010 violence that ousted former President Bakiyev. In mid-June, inter-ethnic violence erupted in the southern cities of Osh and Jalalabad resulting in the deaths of more than 400 people, injuries to thousands, and the destruction or damage of many residences and businesses. Although open violence between ethnic groups ended in June, further unrest could break out suddenly.

The Department of State suggests that U.S. citizens limit travel to the Batken, Osh, and Jalalabad Oblasts where violence has broken out several times in recent years. The travel of U.S. government employees to the area is currently restricted. Land mines in Batken Oblast and near the Kyrgyz-Tajik border continue to be a concern.

Supporters of extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), al-Qaeda, and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement remain active in Central Asia. These groups have expressed anti-U.S. sentiments and may attempt to target U.S. government or private interests in the region, including in the Kyrgyz Republic. In late 2010, Kyrgyz security forces carried out a series of operations against groups the government claims are Islamic extremists seeking to destabilize the country. These security operations have resulted in the death or arrest of several suspects, and several members of the Kyrgyz security forces. These militants are blamed for carrying out a home invasion, planting a car bomb near a Bishkek police station, and detonating an improvised explosive device outside the venue of a large trial in downtown Bishkek resulting in some property damage and minor injuries.

In late November, Kyrgyz Special Forces mounted an operation against suspected terrorists in Osh, resulting in the deaths of all four suspects and the wounding of two special-forces officers.

There are reports of attempted and actual “bride-kidnappings” in some areas of Kyrgyzstan. While foreigners are not usually targeted, a U.S. citizen female was held against her will for several days in one incident in 2007.

The political situation remains unstable, and demonstrations can break out without advance notice. During times of political unrest, demonstrators often gather in front of the Presidential Administration building (White House), the Parliament, and on Alatoo Square in Bishkek’s city center. The Embassy does not always have advance information regarding demonstrations. All U.S. citizens are reminded to avoid the vicinity of any protests, because even protests that are intended to be peaceful can turn confrontational and possibly escalate into violence.

Kyrgyzstan/Country Specific Information available at U.S. Department of State website
My homecountry is like a very sick grandpa. I feel angry at him for being incapable of taking care of himself, and then I feel very guilty in front of him. My grandpa is younger than I am, just 20 years old.

The Kyrgyz Republic got its elusive independence in 1991, and the government screwed it so badly. President Akayev, then President Bakiyev---have continued the tradition of the corrupted totalitarian government in Central Asia. The Kyrgyzstani experiment, labeled so by The Economist, proves to be unsuccessful so far. It took time for me to stop denying that I was born in a country which has a very uncertain future.

But, theoretically, something can be done to effectively rebuild the Kyrgyz nation. In his talk, Collier provided a kind of "alternative" "better" ways of rebuilding the broken nations. So, here are the "better" alternatives to the mentioned common misconceptions about rebuilding the broken nation according to Collier:
"So that is what you get when you face reality. But the objective of facing reality is to change reality. And so now let me suggest two complimentary approaches to changing reality of the situations.

The first is to recognize the interdependence of three key actors, who are different actors, and at the moment are uncoordinated. The first actor is the security council. The security council typically has the responsibility for providing the peacekeepers who build the security. And that needs to be recognized, first of all, hat peacekeeping works. It's a cost-effective approach. It does increase security. But it needs to be done long-term. It needs to be a decade-long approach, rather than just a couple of years. (...)

The second actor, different cast of guys, is the donors. The donors provide the post-conflict aid. Typically in the past, the donors have been interested in the first couple of years, and then they got bored. They moved on to some other situation. Post-conflict economic recovery is a slow process. There are no quick processes in economics, except decline. You can do that quite fast. So the donors have to stick to stick with this situation for at least a decade.

An then the third key actor is the post-conflict governemnt. An there are two key things it's got to do. one it's got to do economic reform, not fuss about the political constitution, it's got to reform economic policy. Why? Because during conflict economic policy typically deteriorates. Government snatch short-term opportunities. And by the end of the conflict, the chickens have come home to roost. So this legacy of conflict is really bad aconomic policy.

So, there is a reform agenda, and there is an inclusion agenda. The inclusion agenda does not come from elections. Elections produce a loser, who is then excluded. So the inclusion agenda means genuinely bringing people inside the tent. So these three actors and they are interdependent over a long term."
In Collier's opinion, if one of the actors does not commit itself to its responsibilities over the decade, the other actors and the citizens of the broken nation do not get the reassurance; the positive shift of thinking is impossible. Hence, there are no private investments; the economy does not recover. The nation loses donors and support. The nation stays broken; civil wars might break out. This is exactly what we experience in Kyrgyzstan during the latest decade: no improvements in the country's economy and the re-occuring violence in the form of revolutions, riots, and inter-ethnic slaughter.

Where is "reassurance" that our economy will recover? Well, this has become a matter of belief. You either believe in the brighter future or not. The "reality" is: the peacekeepers are leaving, the donors are leaving, bussinessmen are wrapping up their bussinesses, minorities are fleeing from Kyrgyzstan, as well as the educated young people and experienced specialists. For more about the state of economy in Kyrgyzstan in English, visit the Carnegie's Kyrgyzstan/Country in Transition website.

All the suggestions proposed by Collier are valuable and might well serve the purpose of the general guidelines. However, if we take a look at the current state of affairs in Kyrgyzstan, it is almost impossible to effectively and peacefully rebuild the broken Kyrgyz nation without setting priorities among our alliances, better said, frenemies: USA(?), Russia(?) or China(?). In 2010, The Economist expert on Asia wrote:
Kyrgyzstan does enjoy an advantage, however: geography. Its strategic location makes it courted by the great powers. Both America and Russia maintain military bases near Bishkek. The American Manas air base, or “transit centre”, as it is now called, is used for supporting American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. It is an important part of a northern supply route developed because of the vulnerability of convoys coming through the Khyber Pass from Pakistan. Russia’s base in Kant is part of an agreement by the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which groups together seven members of the former Soviet Union, to set up a counter-terrorism base in the region.

Russia, the former imperial power, still sees Central Asia as very much its own stamping-ground, so the Manas base has been a source of friction. In 2009 Mr Bakiyev promised Russia it would be closed and was promised aid in return. He reneged on the deal when America increased the rent it was paying.

Now, thanks to WikiLeaks, we know that Kyrgyzstani politicians had told America last year that China also offered it $3 billion if it would close the base. The idea seems improbable but not impossible. China’s behaviour over North Korea, after all, is often interpreted as intended to keep that country as a “buffer”, and avoid having American troops on its own border—as they already are in Kyrgyzstan.

"Enjoys advantage"? This must be ironic. Not in a geographical sense, though, but ideological--Kyrgyzstan is squeezed among powerful governments of Russia, USA and China. And the courtship with the three powerful lovers at a time is a dangerous affair by definition. Despite Collier's "common sense", there is no time for the Kyrgyz nation to implement the reforms and "fix" itself before "fixing" the international relations with Russia, USA and China. Roza Otunbayeva and our government must decide whether they close the American base or not. The steaks are great: closing the Manas base will ensure mutual trust between the Kyrgyz and Russian government; in addition, the Chinese government would prefer no Americans under its expanding belly. In many respects, Kyrgyzstan depends on the charity and trade with Russia and China. On the other hand, leaving the American base and, maybe, even expanding it (due to its importance in the war in Afghanistan), would mean millions of dollars flowing into Kyrgyzstan; a kind of Kyrgyzstani Marshall Plan(?)

So, what is our government up to? How long will it take our government to make up its mind? In the meantime, the Kyrgyz government is ignoring the issue and scrambling money here and there, wasting patience of the frenemies. The guarantee of success of the Kyrgyz Republic lies in the most appropriate choice of the ally for the next decades to come and effective self-management. At any rate, our economic growth demands a big donor, and the style of our development will be unavoidably influenced by our ally.